Im Museum treffen sie den Museumsdirektor Herr Ochiai. In diesem ist u. Als sie auf der Insel ankommen, wissen sie nicht, wo Aso wohnt, und fragen deshalb bei der Stadtverwaltung nach. Der Angestellte dort kennt jedoch niemanden mit diesem Namen. Er soll seine Tochter und seine Frau vorher erstochen und in den letzten Minuten seines Lebens auf dem Klavier Beethovens Mondscheinsonate gespielt haben.
Jedoch ist etwas mit der vierten Zeile nicht in Ordnung, weil ein falscher Klang entsteht. Kogoro vermutet, dass es Kawashimas Abschiedsnachricht sein soll. Es handelt sich dabei um einen Teil der Noten zu Beethovens Mondscheinsonate. Kurz darauf trifft Narumi ein, die den vieren etwas zu essen bringt.
Conan und die Detective Boys spielen im Park Verstecken. Zusammen mit Conan, den Ran mitgebracht hat, besuchen sie die Braut vor der Zeremonie in ihrem Zimmer. Sie sind nicht die einzigen Besucher. Sayuri liegt auf dem Boden und blutet aus dem Mund. Sie rufen den Notarzt, der sie ins Krankenhaus bringt. Es muss sich um eine proteinreiche Substanz handeln. Dieser gesteht daraufhin die Tat. Doch nachdem herauskommt, dass Takasugi und Sayuri sich schon seit ihrer Kindheit kennen und lieben und diese gewusst hat, dass der Tee vergiftet war, bereut er die Tat.
Nach dem Unterricht treffen sich die vier dann vor dem Haus. Conan erinnert das alles an sein eigenes Haus und fragt, ob der Name wirklich Eto sei. Kogoro, Ran und Conan schauen zu. Kogoro kombiniert, dass einige Striche erst im Nachhinein gezogen wurden und dass vorher das Wort "Jungstar" dort stand. Zu Beginn der Episode befinden wir uns auf einer Pferde-Rennbahn. Ein Puzzleteil und eine Seite aus der Bibel, die anscheinend als Notizzettel zweckentfremdet wurde.
A couple of elements in this Conan case reminded me of Noir, one of my favourite anime series. The ripped-off page from the Gospel According to Matthew reminded me of the Langonel Manuscript that Mireille and Kirika desperately seek. Maya's character design and true identity resemble the Cold-Blooded Killer named Shaoli in the eponymous Noir episode.
Lastly and most obviously, Kirika suffers from Amnesia. Sie finden Yumi tot in ihrem Zimmer. Conan bringt Kogoro darauf, dass sie sich nicht selbst erschossen haben kann, da die typischen Schmauchspuren am Einschussloch fehlen. Dessen Chauffeur Tokito bemerkt nicht, dass dem Firmenchef beim Einsteigen die Herztabletten herunter fallen.
Abends besucht Conan den jungen Tokito in dessen Wohnung. Dort hat Conan aber bereits die Durchsuchung des Computers erfolglos beendet, sodass Tokita den kleinen Jungen nur beim Poker spielen erwischt. While this episode is certainly not on the dramatic side, I really commend it for capturing the spirit of childhood, when we used to create our own adventures and explore the magical world around us. Professor Agasa sucht in seinem Haus nach einer Schatzkarte, die sich zwischen seinen Unterlagen befindet.
Die Detective Boys freuen sich riesig auf die Schatzsuche, doch Conan will lieber wissen, wo der Professor die Karte her hat. Dieser grinst und sagt nur, dass er es bald herausfinden wird. Er wischt die Erde weg und dadurch bleibt genug Dreck in den Ritzen stecken, dass man die eingeschnitzte Nachricht wieder entziffern kann:. Auf dem Papier steht, dass sie auf ihrer Schatzsuche viel erlebt und gemeinsame Erfahrungen gesammelt haben. Genau das sei der "Schatz der Erfahrung". Diese Episode spielt am Oktober Conan und Ran laufen durch einen Wald, um das Wochenendhaus der Suzukis zu finden.
Als er sich langsam umdreht, sehen sie, dass sein Gesicht bandagiert ist. Ayako gibt sich die Schuld an Chikakos Tod. Doch alle beruhigen sie. In diesem Moment geht das Licht aus. Kogoro soll einen gewissen Tsuyoshi Kitagawa finden. Riley: Uh, what have you got going on tonight? Buffy: Uh, patrolling. Riley: Patrolling? Buffy: Uh, petroleum. Riley: Petroleum? Buffy: Uh huh. Riley: Tonight you have crude oil?
Buffy: A-and homework. Conan, Ran und Kogoro kommen noch vor dem Feuer an und versuchen Noriko zu beruhigen. Conan schafft es rechtzeitig die Schlumbergera-Kakteen nach oben zu tragen und sie damit vor der geplanten Tat abzuhalten. Am Abend des Kogoro stellt erschrocken fest, dass das der Mann ist, den er die letzten Tage beschattet hat. Kogoro ist der Ehrengast auf der Geburtstagsfeier von der Millionenerbin Reika Yotsui, deren Hund er ein paar Tage zuvor wiedergefunden hat.
Ziel :. Kapitel-Illustration: Conan's Erdbeertorte. Kurz darauf bringt Go Sumi das Essen herein. Nachdem sie angefangen hat zu singen, bemerkt Conan, wie Tatsuya sie dabei traurig beobachtet. Schnell will Ran einen Krankenwagen rufen, doch Conan bemerkt bereits, dass Tatsuya tot ist.
Der Maskierte durchschaut dies jedoch und richtet Conan mit einem Plastikpfeil hin. Bei der Abreise im Flugzeug wollen Conans Eltern wieder eine Weltreise unternehmen, jedoch hat Conan als Revenge die Verlage kontaktiert, sodass Yusaku nun gezwungen ist, seine Arbeit fortzusetzen. Dort kombiniert Conan anhand der Holz- und Glassplitter, dass die Bombe in der leeren Whiskyflasche war. Kogoro, Ran und Conan sind im Skiurlaub.
Nach dem Essen geht jeder seiner eigenen Wege. Zum Abendessen gibt es Shabu Shabu. Neben Sake gibt es auch Pistazien und Bonbons. Eine dunkle Gestalt schleicht sich von hinten an Professor Oyama an. Conan und Kogoro spielen Shogi. Kommissar Megure untersucht den Vermisstenfall Kazuo Tamada. Dieser ist seit zwei Tagen verschwunden und hat, entgegen seiner Angewohnheit, nicht nach der Arbeit zuhause Bescheid gegeben, dass er losgeht. Stattdessen wird Conan davon nur betrunken. Bei Heiji's Knollenwurzelschnaps handelt es sich um eine chinesische Spirituose namens Baigar oder Baijiu.
Bei ihrer Ankunft bemerkt Ran das seltsame Rauschen, das von dem Wasserfall kommt, der sich direkt neben dem Tempel befindet. One that thrives in rain and darkness, eating human souls. It's the fog goblin, the kiri-tengu! Ran: "It's a detective game where players unexpectedly encounter a corpse in a mysterious mansion. The players solve the case while getting hints from Detective Moore, who happens to be there. An einem Sonntagmorgen gehen Conan, Ran und Kogoro joggen. Die Moris, die gerade weiter laufen wollten, rennen sofort zu ihm. Dort ist in der Spiegelung der Fenster zu sehen, wie er nach dem Mord die Klaviersaiten hat verschwinden lassen.
Nach dem Abendessen warten alle auf Kanaya, doch dieser taucht nicht auf. Conan und Heiji, der auch an der Reise teilnimmt, da er hofft hier Shinichi zu treffen, rennen zu dem Wagen und klopfen an die Scheibe, doch Kanaya reagiert nicht. Sein Name ist Hiroshi. Den Geschenkumschlag beziehungsweise die Kondolenzkarte kauft Hiroshi in einem Schreibwarenladen namens Izumi. Hier soll Hiroshi eigentlich Aburaage frittierte Tofu-Taschen kaufen. Laut Aga-Search spielt diese Episode am 7. Juli, dem Tag des japanischen Tanabata-Festes.
Doch wenn er nachschaut, ist niemand zu sehen. Die vier fahren zur Wohnung von Omura. Masami Kusaka, ein Freund des Toten, berichtet, dass Yoshiro vor seinen Augen zusammenbrach, aber da die Laterne kaputt war, konnte Kusaka nichts Genaues erkennen. Vor Spielbeginn zieht jeder einen Zettel, der seine geheim zu haltende Rolle im Spiel kennzeichnet. Schneider, Friseurin, Krankenschwester usw. Die Izu-Halbinsel jap. Folgende Conan-Episoden spielen sich in Izu ab:.
Ran taucht auf, und Conan muss sich eine Ausrede einfallen lassen warum er nass ist. Nachdem Conan sich umgezogen hat, begeben sich die Beiden in das Restaurant , wo sie mit Kogoro, Satoru und Akiko an einem Tisch sitzen. It blows from the left of that statue toward the right. It's called Princess Wind and it's a famous local feature. Doch statt einer Flasche liegen zwei im Fach. Kogoro glaubt, dass da jemand mehrere Flaschen gezogen und eine vergessen haben muss.
Vor ihren Augen stirbt ein junger Mann namens Nagai. Dadurch kommt Conan die Idee, wie der Mord passiert sein muss, kann es jedoch nicht beweisen. Kurz darauf stellt sich Miyuki Nanjo vor, seine Ehefrau. Conan findet es seltsam, weil es sich um eine fiktive Figur handelt. Der Beweis ist, dass auf einem Fax Blut ist, wodurch die genaue Tatzeit herausgefunden werden kann. Doch das Gift muss vorher an seinen Finger gelangt sein.
He took the number and redesigned to look like K-I-D. In dem Moment taucht Kaito auf dem Dach des Hotels auf. April werde ich mich auf der Queen Sallybeth einschiffen.
Southeast Asian Studies
Conan : "Serena's mom gave us a hint. She said she entrusted the real pearl to the most fitting person. Pearls symbolize women and the moon. Of all the people on board, the only woman whose name has the character for moon in it is Tomoko Sebastian. She was wearing the real one herself! It was a dead giveaway.
Nach diesem Vorfall, brach Hideomi die Schule ab und versuchte sich als Schriftsteller. Zwei Tage lang sucht man nach den verschwundenen Hideomi, doch man findet ihn nicht. Megure schaut vom Balkon nach unten und sieht eine bandagierte Person, die dann mit einem Enterhaken den Balkon erklimmt. Heute hat er jedoch Sachen dabei. Jedoch gibt es nirgendwo im Park einen Ginkgobaum.
Die Detective Boys fangen an, selbst zu ermitteln, und nehmen sich den Skizzenblock zur Hilfe. Sie finden dann den Ort, den er immer gezeichnet hat. Die Drei schellen an und Kimie Hayase bittet sie herein. Sie bietet den vier Kindern Saft und Kekse an. Conan ist sich daraufhin sicher, dass der tote Mann noch einmal dort war. Sie rennen aus dem Zimmer, Conan in jenes, in welchem sich zuvor der "Mord" abspielte, Kogoro in das, in dem er den Mord vermutet.
In dem Zimmer, in welches Conan rennt, liegt jedoch nur noch die Gliederpuppe. Kogoro derweil wurde niedergeschlagen, liegt zusammengebrochen vor dem erstochenen Chirurgen Dr. Katsutoshi Eto. Ran, Sonoko und Conan machen einen Skiausflug. Er habe ein anonymes Telegramm bekommen, dass hier irgendetwas passieren wird. Shimoda sieht nach und findet den steifgefrorenen Sugiyama, mit dem Kopf an die Klingel gelehnt.
Conan untersucht die Leiche und findet Strangulierungsmale am Hals und ein weiteres Zeichen auf der Hand. Darin sehen wir zu Beginn den fiktiven alten Vampirfilm Thirst for Blood. Schon bald kommen sie bei der Horrorvilla an, welche nicht gerade sehr einladend aussieht. Kogoro bekommt dann den Auftrag, seine Frau zu beobachten, weil Daisuke glaubt, sie ginge fremd. Da die Polizei wegen des starken Schneefalls nicht kommen kann, beginnt Kogoro selbst zu ermitteln. Hamura bemerkt dann, dass die Szene wie im Film "Das Blutbankett" inszeniert ist. Jedoch war es nicht der echte Pflock im Raum mit den Filmen.
Der wahre Pflock war in der Besenkammer versteckt. Dann gesteht Toshiya. Das Motiv war seine Schwester, die seit ihrer Geburt krank war.
Torakura hatte die Behandlung bezahlt, jedoch nur, um sie gerade am Leben zu halten. Ihr Zustand verbesserte sich nicht und sie starb. Auf der Waffen-Box steht:. Ran und Conan haben sich zur Abwechslung einmal an einem Abend eine Pizza bestellt. Er soll sich wohl mit einem alten Freund getroffen haben. In der Stadt muss sich aber sein Freund schon wieder verabschieden und steigt in ein Polizei-Auto. Kogoro geht deswegen wieder zum Bahnhof, um nach Hause zu fahren, obwohl es erst halb 8 ist. Als er wieder aufwacht, schafft er es noch gerade so, aus dem Zug auszusteigen.
Kogoro setzt sich auf ein paar Treppenstufen , um sich wieder auszuruhen. Er erkennt sie als Sachiko Shimamura. Er hebt aus Versehen einen anderen Kugelschreiber auf, der schon im Auto gelegen hat. Jedoch kann sie das nicht glauben. Sie schildert den Tathergang und auch, dass er Akonitin getrunken haben soll. Nanae, die ebenfalls Zauberin ist, und Motoyasus drei Lehrlinge haben ihn zusammen im Hobbykeller gefunden. Block aus Super Mario erinnerte. Mako erscheint mit Ayano auf den Armen. Tsukumo konnte nicht ertragen, das Makos Bruder besser war. Zusammen mit Kikuemon und dessen Schwiegertochter nehmen sie einen Tee ein.
Es ist Asami Uchida, die ehemalige Schulsprecherin ihrer Mittelschule. Punkt Mitternacht kommt dann ein Fax von einem Professor von der Uni. Jedoch bemerken sie, dass Asami bereits eingeschlafen ist, obwohl sie nun alle zum Karaoke fahren wollen. Es war Manabu Sawai, der vom Supermarkt aus das Fax losschickte. Manabu hatte das Fax vom Professor kopiert und hat es nun immer noch in seiner Hosentasche. Sie gab ihm bereits in der Vergangenheit einen Korb und das war ihm noch nie passiert. Sie verliebte sich in Shinichi, als dieser ehrlich antwortete, dass ihr Kuchen furchtbar schmecke.
Ran versteht nicht, dass sie damit gemeint ist. Er schaffte es mithilfe eine Tricks, dass die Anzeige im Fahrstuhl manipuliert werden konnte. Eine Gestalt sitzt in einem dunklen Zimmer. Daraus schlussfolgern Kogoro und Conan, das es sich um eine Art Code handelt. Kogoro glaubt, dass die Zahl "" mit einem Hund zu tun hat, und sucht alle Digitaluhren mit Hundemotiv zusammen und bringt sie ins Wohnzimmer. Jedoch ist in keinem etwas versteckt. Um zehn nach elf Uhr klingelt die Kuckucksuhr im Arbeitszimmer und eine seltsame Figur kommt heraus, die Ran einen Schrecken einjagt.
Die Anwesenden schauen sich die Kuckucksuhr an, auf der die drei Goblin-Figuren erschienen sind. Kogoro erinnert sich allerdings, dass zwei am Eingang zu finden waren. With those three letters at the head of the word "ito", you get "lito", "nito" and "rito". With Japanese pronunciation, that's "light", "night" and "right". So at night we should shine some light onto the lion on the right. In September , about 60 villagers built a road to the state forest land as part of the programme. Similarly, another road was constructed in the following month.
By the end of October , the villagers, in co-. The plan was to start planting mahogany in the state forest when the seedlings were high enough. Wahid arrived with a relative of his who was also a member of a peasant organisation from the neighbouring Selokerto village, and another man who belonged to the inner circle of the organisation, but whom I never saw taking part in forest management.
Senior SFC staff took over the forum, outlining what was expected from the forest peasant groups: organisational structure, identity cards for all members, a forest management plan with all the details and calculations of capital input from the peasants. This meeting could be described as a turning point in the negotiation of the rights to state forest land at the village level as the position of the SFC staff was far stronger in the face of the few villagers present.
Pak Wahid, meanwhile, seemed to be willing to accept the conditions set by the SFC. The growing power of the SFC in village negotiations derived partly from the insecure and confusing situation at the district level where the district government was forced to cancel the Regional Regulation on community-based forest management which would have allowed peasants to have power over state forest land management surmounting that of the SFC.
Simultaneously, however, the SFC was lobbying the central and provincial governments which had superior power over the district government. Villagers became. Why did Pak Wahid have difficulties in connecting with the village elite while he was recognised as the right person to lead peasant mobilisation and land distribution and negotiations with the SFC, at least initially?
The other reason relates to factors of status and tradition as a source of authority that have become embedded in the Javanese administration. Leadership in this land dispute was mostly based on different qualities of leadership than village leadership, as I will describe below. Tradition as a Source of Authority Ward Keeler has noted that in Javanese society all interaction is about status Keeler, , pp. Such norms as being refined halus or being coarse kasar , maintaining harmony rukun , and working voluntarily for the community gotong royong have been mentioned as major principles in Javanese village custom.
Siegel , pp. Javanese speech has different levels that mark the status of the speaker. By using the right level of language and tone ngoko or kromo one avoids upsetting the other partner to the exchange; sentences are for the listener, not for the speaker. The notion of respect informs authority building in the village.
Younger people, whatever their position, should offer respect to their elders. The village functionaries and other high status persons should be respected by those in lower positions. At the same time, if one fails to be respected, it is difficult to have authority in the eyes of the villagers. It is obvious that one should respect the elite members of the community and any kind of resistance disrespect is often interpreted by the village elite as harsh behaviour or stupidity.
Pak Wahid was a former village head and he had experience perjuangan in working for the village. He had, however, been expelled from his position because of his extra-marital affair and because, according to the new legislation, he did not fulfil the criteria for formal leadership lacking a certificate of secondary education and was therefore ineligible as a candidate. In other words, his power in the Javanese sense diminished quite suddenly, which in Javanese thinking may imply that his power had moved to someone else Siegel, , p.
Certainly, he could no longer gain support from the village elders and the village elite. A Seloman hamlet head stated that he does not have to order menyuruh peasants to do anything, preferring that local neighbourhood heads see that community members do what is asked. Thus, he meets the smallest neighbourhood unit heads RT or sends them letters, and they pass information and directives onto those living in their locales. The village functionaries often noted that it is difficult to order or ask villagers to do something especially those in a higher position or elders because it does not feel comfortable.
Tidak enak refers to the feeling rasa of being afraid of hurting somebody or lowering oneself by being harsh kasar. The inability or unwillingness to order or ask people to do something may relate to two core values of Javanese adat: rasa and pamrih. When theorising about Javanese culture in relation to Javanese administration, Anderson , p. Keeler , deriving from Anderson , relies on the idea of the potent king as a culturally directing image of a suitable leader, village head or lurah. The village elite seemed not to support his activities for this reason.
The New Order elite rested on the idea of a power-full leader, from the village up to the highest level of governance. It was visible in the way village officials governed and directed a village: effortlessly. In these cases the passive governance of the village elite became linked with the feared and violent state police in a curious way, given that the New Order regime used fear and violence to create order and stability Siegel, , p. Drawing on Foucault, Pemberton has criticised ethnographers for strengthening the New Order discourse on Javanese core values that marginalised struggles and conflicts.
He claims that New Order discourse on Javanese culture and politics produced an ideology that stressed harmony, stability, and family-ness kekeluargaan to suppress conflicts the negative side of selamatan pp. New Order village elites stressed order and stability, marginalising harsh and disrespectful behaviour as dangerous. Pak Wahid had to struggle with the village elite and SFC, while the support from the NGOs and peasant union were not enough to strengthen his position, or sometimes even undermined it, and for this reason Wanasana villagers failed to secure rights to the state forest land.
In post-Suharto Java, however, it was possible for Pak Wahid to struggle for power and be supported by those parts of the village which had taken part in the land dispute, because of his extra-state sources of authority and the fall of a regime which had been shown to be corrupt in many ways.
Conclusion I have explored how people draw from different sources of authority in a post-Suharto, upland Javanese forest village in their struggle for state forest land. Taking a hybrid view on the formation of authority, my principal questions were: From what sources of authority do villagers draw and how does authority formation inform this forest land dispute and the relations between the state and society?
The case study examined here clearly indicates that the ideal of an exemplary centre and a powerful leader and authoritative figure informs authority building at the village level. However, as noted by Keeler , villagers tend to resist the concentration of power in one person by distributing their loyalty and building alliances with many authority figures in order to reduce their dependency and protect their personal sovereignty.
Thus, authority building is a two-way process: People build their authority by using different sources, on the one hand, and distribute their loyalty and create patron-client relations with numerous people, on the other. In the case of Pak Wahid, he gained followers by mobilising people in the land dispute, but the same people also built alliances with the village functionaries and his opponents in the village head elections who had upward connections.
During the New Order period, the bureaucracy became a dominant power source in ordering the lives of people. Bureaucracy was, however, informed by Javanese ideas of authority and power. Those owning land or belonging to powerful or wealthy families could gain a position in the official structure where they should behave according to their status position — passively, in a word. The New Order regime rhetoric stressed stability stabilitas as the basis of the Indonesian nation state, and the positions of the village elite and staff were related to a reinforcement of this order.
Order was further buttressed by an imposed hierarchy and constant references to such concepts as kasar, halus, and pamrih in the village. However, new kinds of rationales for authority emerged too: Those having material wealth or education could gain authority as long as they were loyal to the ruling party GOLKAR and the state Pancasila6. Due to the changes in national politics decentralisation , the withdrawal of President Suharto, public criticism of corrupt bureaucracy and politicians, and open contestation over state forest land new sources could be invoked.
Villagers who wanted to gain access to land created patron-client relations with Pak Wahid the landless or poor, illegal loggers, and jobless and became his followers in the land struggle. For many, however, Pak Wahid was considered too active, harsh, and outspoken to become a village head, but these qualities became the basis of his authority in the land dispute making it possible for him to lead negotiations in the village and with the SFC. Modern authority and village leadership are informed by certain Javanese qualities considered suitable for a leader. However, the villagers have new sources of authority due to national and local political changes.
These new sources seemed to open space for innovative kinds of negotiations and to challenge the power of the SFC or traditional authority figures, while not bringing any real transformation of the power structure in the village or of that between the SFC and the villagers. References Adi, N.
Walpole, P. Communities transforming forestlands. Java, Indonesia. Anderson, B. Language and power: Exploring political cultures in Indonesia. Exemplary centre, administrative periphery: Rural leadership and the New Order in Java. Richmond, UK: Curzon Press. Badan Pusat Statistik Kabupaten Wonosobo. Wonosobo dalam angka Changing economy in Indonesia, a selection of statistical material from the early 19th century up to Forests and Forestry Amsterdam, Netherlands: Royal Tropical Institute. SuaraKarya Online. Day, T. Fluid iron: State formation in Southeast Asia.
Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press. Departamen Kehutanan. Sejarah kehutanan Indonesia 2 vols. II—III, periode tahun Jakarta, Indonesia: Menteri Kehutanan. Foucault, M. Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison. London, UK: Penguin Books. Geertz, C. The theatre state in nineteenth-century Bali. Hadiz, V. Localising power in post-authoritarian Indonesia: A Southeast Asia perspective.
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Keeler, W. Javanese shadow plays, Javanese selves. Villagers and the Exemplary Centre in Java. Indonesia, 39, Lounela, A. Contesting forests and power; dispute, violence and negotiation in Central Java. Research Series in Anthropology Helsinki, Finland: University of Helsinki. Nomura, K. The politics of participation in forest management: A case from democratizing Indonesia.
Pemberton, J. Siegel, J. Solo in the New Order: Language and hierarchy in an Indonesian city. Smiet, A. Forest ecology on Java: Conversion and usage in a historical perspective. Journal of Tropical Forest Science, 2 4 , Spyer, P. Cultural Anthropology, 11 1 , Weber, M. On charisma and institution building.
Selected paper, edited and with an introduction by S. In recent years, community forestry has emerged as a means to reform power constellations with regard to forest governance. Through community forestry, the central state promised to devolve several forest rights to local communities and encouraged them to get involved in decision making processes and the implementation of forest activities. However, experience in some countries indicates that the implementation of community forestry programmes is rarely followed by genuine power devolution to local forest users.
Research in eight villages in Central Java province reveals that the community forestry programmes are carefully structured according to numerous administrative procedures and establish a mode of control through a bureaucratic design. Contact: maryudi76 yahoo. Introduction Over the past decade, there have been calls for the devolution of forest control from the central state to local communities. Community forestry promised to devolve several forest rights to local communities and encourage them to get involved in decision making processes and the implementation of forest activities from reforestation to harvesting.
For example, McDermott and Schrekenberg , p.
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- 25th IVR World Congress of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy!
This paper will further support the aforementioned findings on the informal hidden agenda of states in implementing community forestry. Using a case study of a programme implemented in Java, Indonesia, Pengelo-. It reveals that PHBM is carefully structured according to numerous administrative procedures — based on a bureaucratic design — that serve as a mode of control by the forest administration over the forestland and its resources. Theoretical Framework This paper uses theories from political science, which principally focus on the concept of control and the mechanisms used for its enforcement.
Rangan defines control as the ability of the principal to check and direct the behaviour of the agent. For this analysis it is important to understand how control is imposed. The ex post mechanism, which focuses on direct supervision such as police patrols, remains a popular strategy for enforcing legal norms Kraakman, Several political scientists e. Therfore, McCubbins et al.
Here, political control is exercised through the design of bureaucracy and pursued by establishing rules and requirements, imposing decision procedures and criteria, and constraining the agent from moving in the direction it desires Moe, The structure and process mechanism is expected to limit the independence of an agent to make policy actions Bawn, , p.
Unlike most forest companies in Indonesia, Perhutani is autonomous. It directly controls and uses the forest resources, while it also determines forest management, exploitation, marketing as well as protection Maryudi, Peluso describes this centralistic forest tradition at great length. Ensuring ownership means that the state captures the greatest amount of benefits from forest products.
However, as Peluso b notes, this centralistic state control has significantly declined. Furthermore, political struggles over the control of forests emerged as some district governments attempted to dethrone the superiority of Perhutani in administering the state forests in their regions Adi et al. While there have been experiments with community forestry in Java for more than three decades see Peluso, b , a formal policy on community forestry was finally launched in PHBM community forestry serves as a generic model implemented for all forests under the administration of Perhutani.
Since then, there has been a period of intense struggle over the administrative authority of forests between national and local provincial and district governments. However, decentralisation in the forestry sector occcured mainly in regions outside Java. This means that Perhutani remains the authority over most forests in Java.
The primary field data was drawn from interviews, discussions, and other information from various stakeholders such as the respective district forest managers and forest officers, the leaders of the LMDHs, and other relevant stakeholders. The interviews were complemented by reviews of scientific literature and PHBM regulations. Empirical Findings To restore control over forest resources in the PHBM programmes, Perhutani establishes regulatory frameworks and conditions for the community forestry practices through which the company is able to force local people to act according to its desires.
This section discusses the administrative procedures used by Perhutani to exert control over forest resources. While all villages studied in this research have already created such a group, a clear example of the power of this administrative procedure is provided by the case of Temulus. In this village, interest in community forestry has been evident since the end of the s, however, the PHBM was only approved after the establishment of a formally-registered LMDH group in Maryudi, The forest officials of the three forest districts suggested that this requirement ensures the legal enforceability of the PHBM agreement see also Djajanti, The administrative screening is further enhanced by the fact that Perhutani can determine whether particular groups are qualified for the participation in the PHBM agreement.
In most cases, the forest offices facilitated the creation of the LMDHs to make them more reliant and inclined to Perhutani. The agreement itself was prepared by the respective forest district offices as indicated by the identical content and wording for different LMDHs. It is carefully narrated with administrative procedures to limit the access of local people to the forestland and its resources. State ownership of forestland is one of the main elements of the forest administration to restore control over forest resources that is agreed upon in the PHBM agreement. Article 6 of Decision No.
Local people are only permitted to collect non-timber products such as edible fruits, mushrooms, and fodders Djajanti, ; Maryudi, The administrative procedures for ensuring control are further enhanced through management plans and reporting activities. In community forestry programmes, LMDHs are invited to develop so-called management plans, which unfortunately only relate to permitted forest uses, such as the use of the forest floor for agricultural cropping.
Usually, the groups are provided with a planning sheet, which outlines the agricultural crops that are allowed to be planted and indicates where and when these crops are permitted to be planted. This procedure can serve as a screening mechanism for the forest office to instantly prevent misconduct in the forests. A forest officer in Randublatung forest district suggested that some crops such as rice and bananas are prohibited as they would mimic private paddy fields and gardens.
Some local groups also failed in their attempt to propose activities such as planting trees, coffee, and other perennial crops that were considered to impede the growth of the main forest species. In most cases, the creation of local regulations has been heavily influenced by the forest office and appears to enhance its administrative procedures since they are simply copied from the PHBM agreement Maryudi, The formal agreement between the forest office and the LMDHs further specifies both the responsibilities for forest activities and the sanctions that are to be imposed in cases of forest misconduct of the participating LMDHs.
As mentioned above, PHBM encourages the active participation of local communities in forest management and conservation activities. Through the programme, Perhutani expects that communities contribute to reforestation, and the agreement obliges the group comFigure 1: The Two-Tier Permit System in the Java Community Forestry System. Newly reforested areas are parceled out to interested forest users for agricultural cropping for about two to three years. In return, they are obliged to plant prescribed tree seedlings and nurture them.
When the people fail to reach the survival target, they are obliged to replant the forestland. This is particularly important for addressing the problems of reforestation failure that often occured prior to the implementation of the PHBM. Perhutani is also concerned about valuable timber.
Through the PHBM programme, the company aspires to secure the tree stands. In all cases observed in this research, people are expected to actively participate in forest patrols to prevent illegal logging. To ensure this, the forest offices threaten to terminate the agreement upon the discovery of illegal cutting. Given these restrictions, questions may remain about the degree to which the extensive administrative procedures and regulations work on the ground. In other cases, scholars e. In this study, the influence of local elites such as village leaders, civil servants, teachers, and religious leaders, is also visible across the research cases.
These people usually dominate the structure of the group committee and the decision making in the group, and also capture most of the benefits obtained from PHBM Maryudi, For Perhutani, controlling the committees can mean control over the group members and their activities in the forests. In this regard, the administrative procedures are manifested by the attachment of a forest officer, albeit indirectly, as an adviser on the committee structure of all LMDHs. While greater control over the forests can be achieved, Perhutani benefits from reduced costs, which are transferred to the group committees as a consequence.
Persuasion is employed as a common strategy — particularly for minor misconduct — but heavy and persistent misconduct can lead to severe punishments. In Benowo and. In Sedayu, some group members have been ejected from the group due to persistent infringement. Conclusion This paper reveals that the PHBM programme is systematically set up to ensure that forestland and resources are kept under tight control of the state through numerous administrative procedures. The informal agenda associated with the implementation of community forestry is veiled in a scheme that supposedly formally serves the interests of local people.
Through the use of group committees, Perhutani has additionally produced an effective mechanism of surveillance in the forests, whereby the forest office no longer has to directly control forest activities, and thus lifts the burden of supervision in this area from its own responsibilities. Consequently, signs of forest order emerge. While more empiricallybased case studies are indeed required to provide more solid justification, local people in the studied villages are clearly experiencing increased control.
Instead, the challenge that lies ahead is to create better instruments that can integrate the interests of Perhutani to improve the forest conditions and the needs of local communities for meaningful benefits from the forests. The participation of local people in forest conservation and management should be met with genuine attempts to improve their livelihood and quality of life. Here, a much improved legal access to the forest by local people is the key of the future implementation of PHBM.
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Wulan, Y. Analisa konflik sektor kehutanan di Indonesia Hopes were high that this would improve local development and contribute to more sustainable forest management. However, undesired outcomes of decentralisation have been counteracted by an immediate effort to recentralise forest governance. In this paper, we address the question what actual impact both de- and recentralisation of forest governance had on the livelihoods of local communities in East Kalimantan.
We show that under decentralised forest governance, unclear functional competences and overlapping authorities of the central and local governments triggered a logging boom that increased inter- and intra-village conflicts, exacerbating inequality, and leading to further deforestation.
On the other hand, the recentralisation of the forestry sector and the increased central state control of illegal logging deprived villagers of lucrative income sources without offering adequate alternatives, while ending therewith associated conflicts. Our case studies thus show that de- and recentralisation had both positive and negative effects on a local level.
However, we argue that continual decentralisation efforts would be more promising for the improvement of local communities in East Kalimantan. Die weitreichenden Dezentralisierungsprozesse, die Indonesien in die Wege geleitet hat, schlossen eine Dezentralisierung des Forstsektors ein. Unsere Ergebnisse beruhen auf Feldforschungen in zwei Dorfgemeinschaften unter Anwendung ethnographischer Methoden. Contact: cathrin. Unsere Fallstudien zeigen somit, dass De- und Rezentralisierung sowohl positive als auch negative Auswirkungen hatten.
A more critical and differentiated view has thus replaced the initial celebration of decentralisation. Governmental and popular hopes for improved living conditions of the local population and a more sustainable forest management did not materialise. While several studies have documented the impact of decentralised forest management in Indonesia, the effect of recentralisation on village level has been hardly documented so far.
In this paper, we address the question of what impact these two subsequent policy shifts had on the intended beneficiaries of new decentralised policies. Our case studies illustrate that decentralisation and recentralisation have. However, we argue that the negative consequences of decentralisation are the result of the sudden and disorderly nature and weak implementation of the decentralisation process in Indonesia, which was conducted in a phase of economic and political crisis and was seen as an instrument for protecting the nation state from breaking up due to separatist movements.
We thus support the argument that recentralising authority is not the best answer to the shortcomings of decentralisation Larson, Instead, we are optimistic that improved decentralised forest policies will be able to reduce the negative impact of decentralisation while strengthening its advantages and thereby offer a more promising future for local communities. We used descriptive and exploratory fieldwork methods, including participant observation, informal interviews and semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions, and village level household surveys.
Informants included a broad range of stakeholders, such as policy-makers and administrators on the district and sub-district level, village authorities, private business operators, NGOs, and village inhabitants. We discussed our findings with local communities and submitted recommendations to district government officials.
After providing a short overview of the legal framework that shaped the de- and recentralisation of forest governance in Indonesia in the next section, we introduce the local setting of Kutai Barat. In the main part of this paper, we describe the impact of decentralisation and the subsequent recentralisation policies within two sample villages. In the final section, we provide an analysis of these impacts and present our arguments for continued decentralisation efforts. De- and Recentralisation of the Indonesian Forestry Sector During the early phase, decentralisation included a temporary relaxation of the highly centralised Indonesian forestry sector.
First steps towards decentralised forest. Law No. The central government retained the authority over foreign policy, defence and security, monetary policy, legal systems, and religious matters while ceding authority over all other policy fields to local governments. These subsequently gained the full responsibility for natural resource management, including forests.
Government Regulation No. Further inconsistencies arose between the decentralisation legislation and the new Basic Forestry Law passed in , as the latter retained the notion of central control McCarthy, , p. In response to these emergent excesses, the Ministry of Forestry withdrew the authority for issuing small-scale concessions from district heads in February Four months later, the central government reinforced this policy when it finally issued the implementing regulations for the new.
Basic Forestry Law 10, which returned the authority over forests to the centre and provided the Ministry of Forestry with the sole authority to issue logging licences Resosudarmo, , p. Finally, the decentralisation laws of were replaced by Laws No. It stretches along the Mahakam River, covering a territory of 31, square kilometres with a population of nearly , people Badan Pusat Statistik, The district population is comprised of a vast amalgam of ethnicities including several Dayak groups, which form the majority of the population, Malay groups like the Banjar and Kutai, and migrant groups from other Indonesian islands.
The district possesses rich forest resources with a state forest area of 2. The development of oil palm estates in the sub-district of Jempang is marked by a long history of conflict and controversy Casson, a, p. The smallholder economy of the district is characterised by swidden agriculture, animal husbandry, market gardening, and small-scale estate crop production. To demonstrate the impact of the subsequent de- and recentralisation policies on local communities, we will employ examples from two villages. According to official village records of , Jambuq has inhabitants living together in households.
The village covers an area of Jambuq villagers subsist mainly on swidden agriculture, forest gardens, and additional income from various monetary sources. Jontai, a Dayak Benuaq15 village, is located in the westernmost part of Kutai Barat on the shore of the Nyuataatn River. The village area is densely forested and is bordered in the north by the province of Central Kalimantan. Numbering inhabitants16 living in 60 households, its settlement size is slightly smaller than that of Jambuq, while the village area, covering The inhabitants of Jontai practice an extended subsistence economy with a high importance of subsistence and a situational orientation towards monetary income.
The largest proportion of the village area 65 percent 17 consists of old secondary and primary forest, while the remaining 35 percent is used for agriculture, including rice cultivation, fallow fields, as well as rattan, rubber, and forest gardens. Commercial logging undertaken by different companies has played a major role in Jontai since the log flood enterprises18 of the late s. The logging company currently active started its operations in the village area in Villagers in Jambuq suspect fire setting on behalf of plantation owners as the major reason for the outbreak in the forest surrounding Jambuq.
A discussion of how different impacts and perceptions of decentralisation are influenced by different ethnic backgrounds is currently in preparation by the authors. The logs were placed at river banks so that they could be transported downriver with the seasonal floods. New forestry regulations issued by the provincial and district governments provided local communities with a larger share of benefits from the forestry sector and improved their access to forests and forest resources.
The decree further demands that HPH-holders make retrospective payments for timber cut during the previous five years Center for Social Forestry, , pp. By the end of , the district government had already granted hundreds of such licences; the actual amount varied between , according to KK-PKD Kutai Barat , p.
The licences were granted to individual inhabitants of Kutai Barat, groups or cooperatives who then mainly worked together with logging companies as contractors to exploit the forest. Negotiations between logging companies and villagers determined the fee contractors would have to pay to the traditional owners of the forest.
However, the new regulations not only provided new income opportunities for local communities but strengthened their customary rights politically. The district government of Kutai Barat further developed community-based forestry management models, such as the IUKhM scheme These initiatives can be seen as an important attempt to provide local communities with legitimate access to their forests. This is of special importance as customary rights to state forest lands are not yet recognised in a meaningful way under national law. The Basic Forestry Law of acknowledges adat24 rights as long as adat still exists and is not contrary to national interests or to superior national legislation.
However, this acknowledgement of customary rights in state forests only provides people with forest management rights and rights to collect forest products but does not recognise ownership rights. The legal insecurity which arose through unclear functional assignments and overlapping authorities within the forestry sector triggered a logging boom during the early phase of decentralisation. The villagers in Kutai Barat enjoyed practically free access to their forest and thus set up their own logging operations.
Many HPHH-holders also made use of this opportunity by extending their logging operations well beyond the actual boundaries of their concession area as the district government lacked the capacity to monitor the implementation of these small-scale licences. As adat also includes traditional law, it is sometimes used synonymously with customary law. In Jambuq, decentralised forest governance led to two substantial changes. These payments were allocated to village development 30 percent and direct cash payments to the villagers 70 percent.
The first compensation in included retrospective payments for the previous five years, with a total amount of IDR million USD 53, . This monetary distribution depended on the age of the family head, status within the village, and, for immigrants, the time the family had spent in the village. While statements by informants concerning the first compensation payment were consistent, they were contradictory concerning the amounts paid out in the following years.
Nevertheless, the distribution of kompensasi within the village was unclear as villagers had limited information and some families did not receive payments at all. Second, access to the forest was possible due to negotiations between the HPHholder and village leaders. This led to an agreement that village leaders could grant permits for cutting particular tree species25 to villagers or external operators in the HPH-area, which is considered communally owned forest according to adat.
For forest areas that are claimed by individuals or groups due to inheritance rights according to adat, fees for chainsaw operators were increased to IDR 50, USD 5. However, village leaders showed an unwillingness to regularly inform people of the fee amounts. Increased financial revenues on the village and district level which corresponded with logging activities opened up opportunities for development activities at the expense of forests.
Government programmes for private business credits, education, and health were introduced in the village as in other parts of Kutai Barat. For Jambuq, infrastructure projects e. Although welcomed by most of the villagers, both development activities and cash payments led to new problems in terms of transparency and the distribution of shares.
Village leaders were in the powerful position of gatekeepers who could decide who participated in development programmes and who did not. Moreover, village leaders controlled compensation payments and fees, and profited disproportionately from these payments, as democratic institutions on the village level remained weak. Additionally, no efficient control mechanism was institutionalised by the district or sub-district government at this stage of decentralisation.
Thus, village leaders accumulated new power and villagers became increasingly dependent on local elites. In addition, some families invested the money in education or future income options such as kiosks and chainsaws. However, these temporary effects contrast with other outcomes, such as increased inequality and conflicts among villagers, neighbour associations, and neighbouring villages mainly over boundaries of logging permits and the distribution of compensation and fees as well as growing distrust as a consequence of the limited availability of information.
Various aspects of elite capture in Indonesia can be found, e. The villagers in Jontai interpreted the changes in the forestry sector after decentralisation as a re-establishment of their customary rights. Formerly, the forest has been in the grip of the state. Now timber is coming under adat rights again. Formerly, the people were quiet and did not dare to talk. Formerly, the state was still in power, but now the forest has been returned from the state to the people T. Usni, personal communication, September 10, In cooperation with a local logging company, the villagers gained one of the new small-scale logging licences.
Each of these groups was represented by a partly self-appointed leader who was responsible for the arrangements with the logging company and the distribution of the fee payments among all group members. Although 73 percent of all households received fee payments, the amount a person received varied greatly according to the honesty of the group leader, the size of the respective location as well as the number of people belonging to his or her inheritance group. Single children had a definite advantage as they did not have to share the fee payments with siblings.
However, people in powerful positions gained the largest advantages because village elites with noble origins received the highest profits. As a consequence of the de facto open access to the forest, people also started to set up their own small logging operations along new and abandoned logging roads which meander through the village area. Timber traders came regularly into the forest to collect square blocks and shelves sawn by the villagers.
Prices varied according to timber species. Shorea spp. In one week, an experienced chainsaw operator working on his own location could thus earn an income of up to IDR 3 million USD . This contributed to active involvement in logging although the villagers were aware of the negative longterm effects. Diren, personal communication, August 31, Furthermore, some villagers perceived it as their longstanding right to cut timber and finally gain financial profit as various companies had earned fortunes from their forests over the last decades while they remained poor.
With new income from logging and fee payments, material wealth increased. Many families invested their growing income into house building and the purchase of motorbikes, working tools, and electronic equipment. Because most logging money was received by young men, a large amount of it was also spent on alcohol, gambling, and prostitution. A few households used their increased income for long-term investments and education. For example, the first adolescent from Jontai that took up university studies was financed by fee money. Poverty, corruption, terrorism, slow economic growth, unemployment but also illegal logging were commonly viewed as the most serious problems.
With recentralisation, the district government lost its authority over state forests. Subsequently, community-based forest management models created by the local government under decentralised forest governance in Kutai Barat were restricted to the existing , hectares of non-forest areas Nugroho et al, , p. While decentralisation can be seen as a move into the forest from the perspective of local communities, recentralisation can be seen as a movement out of the forest. Impact on Jambuq. While the logging operations of the local HPH-company continued largely unaffected, all self-organised logging operations came to an immediate halt due to the increased control of logging activities that were considered illegal by the central government.
The resulting loss of fee payments reduced village funds significantly although compensation payments continued. The loss of income from self-organised logging was felt severely by most villagers as obligations, such as for motorbikes or TVs, continued and cash needs for electricity, education and so forth increased successively. In the search for new income options, most had to turn to less lucrative alternatives.
Immediately after controls started, only a few villagers continued their logging activities in spite of legal restrictions. For the majority of villagers, the cutting and cleaning of rattan became the temporary major income source. A year later, however, when the stocks of valuable rattan species were harvested and no capital was available to buy rattan for processing in neighbouring villages the situation changed.
The majority of villagers gave up rattan processing and resumed subsistence activities such as farming and to a lesser degree fishing as well as additional small-scale cash crop production, such as rubber. Few people temporarily left the village searching external wage labour. Both logging and rattan activities disappeared from the village. As a result, villagers have suffered from distinct losses of income while the remaining alternatives have been seen as a step backwards. As hopes for self-determination and a changing political climate were heavily disappointed, the majority of village inhabitants showed a lack of understanding of the.
Tommy, personal communication, December 1, Finally, the cessation of self-organised logging operations contributed to the easing of social conflicts as the main contentious issue, the distribution of benefits from logging, largely disappeared. In the same manner, inequality partly decreased although village elites remain powerful. Impact on Jontai. Increased controls of illegal logging by the central government led to the cessation of self-organised logging operations in late In view of the strong police presence, regular confiscations of chainsaws, and high penalties, nobody dared to work in the forest or transport timber anymore.
The local logging company also stopped its operations temporarily, but several months later continued under a new concession licence IUPHHK29 , issued directly by the Ministry of Forestry. The company is thus no longer the contractor of the villagers as it was under the HPHH regulation. This immediately adversely affected the bargaining power of the villagers. As a more positive effect of the recentralisation policies, the number of conflicts within the village declined, as exemplified in Jambuq.
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It also became increasingly obvious that most of the people who had received large fee payments had not reinvested their money. Kira, personal communication, November 25, Despite this positive impact, most villagers felt disappointed in the recent policy changes. Most households experienced a severe loss of income and a lack of alternative income opportunities while facing rising living costs due to rising prices and in-.
Several families reported that they had to hand back items bought on credit or had to sell gold jewellery in order to make ends meet. In , most households in Jontai shifted back to subsistence strategies, earning cash through the selling of agricultural products 33 percent and rattan 33 percent while the remaining households were seeking daily wage labour.
Some households also sold a certain kind of grass kapilongan to the coal mining area downriver where the grass is planted to mount the waysides of mining roads. In comparison to logging, rattan or grass cutting and selling was perceived as hard and unsatisfying work and villagers expressed hopes for new coal mining operations in their area, anticipating high compensation payments.
Discussion Our findings demonstrate that both decentralisation and recentralisation of forest governance have been a mixed blessing for local communities. While decentralisation opened up new economic opportunities, strengthened customary rights, and provided a feeling of increased self-determination, it encouraged unsustainable logging practices, led to rising numbers of conflicts, and increasing inequality.
Recentralisation, on the other hand, has led to a decline of conflicts and reduced inequalities which were caused by the unequal distribution of benefits from logging, fee, and HPH-compensation payments. However, it also robbed local communities of important income sources without offering adequate alternatives. It has weakened customary rights and people have lost their recently-attained access to the forest again. Recentralisation brought an end to the logging boom and its excessive outgrowth, but logging operations are now exclusively in the hands of companies again.
Despite the indisputable shortcomings of decentralisation, we argue for a resumption of decentralisation efforts because we are convinced that: a many negative effects of regional autonomy were rather caused by its sudden and disorderly nature and weak implementation than by the mere devolution of political authority,. Regional autonomy was intended to loosen these tensions by providing the regions with more power and a larger economic share. After 32 years of marginalisation, both local elites and local communities were eager to take the chance to finally benefit from their forests.
The central government was thus unable to enforce national laws and policies or monitor district activities, which made it easy for local governments and local elites to take advantage of the situation.